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Abstract—The Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the latest mobile
standard being implemented globally to provide connectivity and
access to advanced services for personal mobile devices. Moreover,
LTE networks are considered to be one of the main pillars for the
deployment of Machine to Machine (M2M) communication sys-
tems and the spread of the Internet of Things (IoT). As an enabler
for advanced communications services with a subscription count
in the billions, security is of capital importance in LTE. Although
legacy GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) net-
works are known for being insecure and vulnerable to rogue base
stations, LTE is assumed to guarantee confidentiality and strong
authentication. However, LTE networks are vulnerable to security
threats that tamper availability, privacy and authentication. This
manuscript, which summarizes and expands the results presented
by the author at ShmooCon 2016 [1], investigates the insecurity
rationale behind LTE protocol exploits and LTE rogue base
stations based on the analysis of real LTE radio link captures from
the production network. Implementation results are discussed
from the actual deployment of LTE rogue base stations, IMSI
catchers and exploits that can potentially block a mobile device.
A previously unknown technique to potentially track the location
of mobile devices as they move from cell to cell is also discussed,
with mitigations being proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the newest cellular
communications standard globally deployed. Regardless of
previous generations, with coexistence of different technolo-
gies for mobile access, all operators are globally converging to
LTE for next generation mobile communications. With a fully
redesigned PHYsical layer, built upon Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), LTE networks provide
orders of magnitude higher rates and lower traffic latencies,
combined to a strong resiliency to multipath fading and overall
improved efficiency in terms of bits per second per unit
of bandwidth. This highly improved Radio Access Network
(RAN), is architected over the Enhanced Packet Core (EPC)
network to provide connectivity to all types of mobile devices
[2].
LTE cellular networks deliver advanced services for bil-
lions of users, beyond traditional voice and short message
communications, as the cornerstone of today’s digital and
connected society. Moreover, mobile networks are one of the
main enablers for the emergence of Machine to Machine
(M2M) systems, with LTE expected to play a key role in the
Inernet of Things (IoT) revolution [3]. Consequently, M2M
and the IoT are often analyzed as key elements within the
LTE security ecosystem [4].
Given the widespread usage, with a subscription count
in the billions, securing the connectivity of mobile devices
is of extreme importance. The first generation of mobile
networks (1G) lacked of support for encryption and legacy
2G networks lack of mutual authentication and implement an
outdated encryption algorithm [5]. The wide availability of
open source implementations of the GSM protocol stack has
resulted in many security research projects unveiling several
exploits possible on the GSM insecure radio link.
Specific efforts were thus made to ensure confidentiality
and authentication in mobile networks, resulting in much
stronger cryptographic algorithms and mutual authentication
being explicitly implemented in both 3G and LTE. Based on
this, LTE is generally considered secure given this mutual
authentication and strong encryption scheme. As such, con-
fidentiality and authentication are wrongly assumed to be suf-
ficiently guaranteed. LTE mobile networks are still vulnerable
to protocol exploits, location leaks and rogue base stations.
Based on the analysis of real LTE traffic captures obtained
from live production networks in the areas of New York
City and Honolulu, this manuscript discusses the insecurity
rationale behind LTE protocol exploits and rogue base stations.
Despite the strong cryptographic protection of user traffic
and mutual authentication of LTE, a very large number of
control plane (signaling) messages are exchanged over an LTE
radio link in the clear regularly. Before the authentication and
encryption steps of a connection are executed, a mobile device
engages in a substantial conversation with *any* LTE base
station (real or rogue) that advertises itself with the correct
broadcast information. This broadcast information is sent in
the clear and can be easily sniffed [6], allowing an adversary
to easily configure and set-up a rogue access point. Real
samples of LTE broadcast traffic are captured and analyzed
to exemplify this and discuss potential ways this information
could be leveraged with a malicious intent.
Motivated by this LTE protocol insecurity rationale, this
manuscript explores different areas of mobile network security
with low-cost software radio tools. Based on an open source
implementation of the LTE stack, openLTE [7], a series of
exploits are demonstrated and implemented. Discussion is pro-
vided regarding the implementation of low-cost IMSI catchers
as well as exploits that allow blocking mobile devices, which
were publicly introduced for the first time in [8] and shortly
after also discussed in [1]. Moreover, based on the analysis
of real LTE traffic captures, a new location information leak
in the LTE protocol is introduced, which allows potentially
tracking LTE devices as they move. Potential mitigations and
security discussions are provided for these exploits as well.c© Copyright 2016 Bloomberg L.P. All rights reserved.
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This manuscript is an extended report of the results pre-
sented in [1] and summarizes the author’s research in LTE
mobile security and protocol exploits research over the last
few years. The remainder of the manuscript is organized as
follows. Section II introduces the relevant background on LTE
mobile network operation. Then, Section III and Section IV
discuss the tools leveraged to analyze and implement the LTE
protocol exploits herein introduced and details on the LTE
traffic captures analyzed, respectively. The rationale behind
the insecurity of LTE networks and discussion on LTE rogue
base stations and exploits are included in Section V. Section
VI overviews related work on mobile network exploit analysis
and security research. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. LTE MOBILE NETWORKS
LTE mobile networks split their architecture into two
main sections: the Radio Access Network (RAN) and the
core network, known as the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) [2].
The RAN of an LTE network is comprised of the mobile
terminals, known as User Equipment (UE), and eNodeBs, or
LTE base stations. The evolution of mobile networks towards
LTE highly specializes and isolates the functionality of the
RAN. In current mobile deployments, the LTE RAN is able
to, independently from the EPC, assign radio resources to
UEs, manage their radio resource utilization, implement access
control, and, leveraging the X2 interface between eNodeBs,
manage mobility and handoffs.
Fig. 1. LTE network architecture
The EPC, in turn, is in charge of establishing and managing
the point-to-point connectivity between UEs and the Internet.
In order to do so, the EPC leverages a series of nodes.
The Serving Gateway (S-GW) and the PDN (Packet Data
Network) Gateway (P-GW) are the two routing anchors for
user traffic connectivity to the PDN. Once a connection is
established, user data flows from the UE to the eNodeB,
and is then routed over the S-GW and P–GW towards the
PDN. In parallel to the routing functionality of both gateways,
the Mobility Management Entity (MME) handles logistics of
the bearer establishment and release, mobility management,
and other network functionalities, such as authentication and
access control. In order to provide security for user traffic
and execute mutual authentication, the MME communicates
with the Home Subscriber Server (HSS), which stores the
authentication parameters, secret keys, and user account details
of all the UEs. The HSS is also leveraged upon incoming
connections for mobile devices, in order to address paging
messages.
Fig. 2. LTE Cell Selection and connection
Any mobile device or User Equipment (UE) attempting to
access the network must follow a series of steps illustrated
in Figure 2. The process is initiated by the cell selection
procedure, which involves the detection and decoding of the
Primary Synchronization Signal (PSS) and the Secondary
Synchronization Signal (SSS). Then, the Physical Broadcast
Channel (PBCH) is decoded to extract the most basic system
configuration in the Master Information Block (MIB), such as
the system bandwidth, which allows the other channels in the
cell to be configured and operated. The remaining details of
the configuration of the cell are extracted from the System
Information Blocks (SIB), which are unencrypted and can be
eavesdropped by a passive radio sniffer. Once at this point, the
UE initiates an actual connection with the network by means
of a random access procedure and establishes, via the NAS
(Non-Access Stratum) Attach process, an end-to-end bearer in
order to send and receive user traffic.
Figure 3 illustrates the connection process through which
a mobile device attaches to the network and a point-to-point
IP bearer is set up to provide data connectivity. The NAS
Attach procedure contains a number of steps, involving all the
elements in the EPC. The Random Access procedure assigns
radio resources to the UE so it can set up a Radio Resource
Control (RRC) connection with the eNodeB. The next step is to
execute the identity/authentication procedure between the UE
and the MME, which in turn leverages the HSS to configure
security attributes and encryption. Finally, the point-to-point
circuit through the SGW and PGW is set up, and the RRC
connection is reconfigured based on the type of QoS (Quality
of Service) requested. At this point, the UE is in the connected
RRC state.
A. Mobile network identifiers
A number of identifiers are used in the operation of an LTE
mobile network. The most important ones, in the context of
this manuscript, are the following:
• IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity. This is
a unique identifier for the SIM card in a mobile device.
The IMSI is a secret identifier that should be kept private
and not transmitted in the clear as it can be used to track
devices and other types of exploits [9].
Fig. 3. LTE NAS attach procedure
• TMSI: Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier. This is
the identifier used to uniquely address a given device
instead of the IMSI. Once the device connects to the net-
work for the first time, a TMSI is derived and used there-
after. The TMSI is also refreshed periodically, though not
as much as it should [5].
• MSISDN: Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number. This is the
id that identifies the user and owner of a mobile device,
i.e. the user’s phone number. It is mapped to the TMSI
in a similar way a url is mapped to an IP address.
• IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identifier. It
uniquely identifies the hardware (i.e. smart-phone) used
to connect to the network. It can be thought as a the serial
number of a mobile device. The IMEI should ideally also
be kept secret as, based on its value, one can easily know
the type of mobile device the user has (make and model)
and well as, in the case of an embedded M2M device, the
software version it is running.
III. LTE SECURITY ANALYSIS TOOLS
Over the last few years, a number of open source projects
have been developed, providing the right tools for sophisticated
LTE security research. Running on off-the-shelf software radio
platforms, these open source libraries provide, in some cases,
the functionality of software-based eNodeB. With not too
complex modifications of the code, they can easily be turned
into LTE protocol analyzers, stingrays and rogue base stations,
as it will be discussed throughout this manuscript.
The main LTE open source implementations being actively
developed can be summarized as follows1:
• openLTE [7]: Currently the most advanced open source
implementation of the LTE stack. It provides a fully func-
tional LTE connection, including the features of the LTE
packet core network. With proper configuration, it can
operate NAS protocols and provide access to the Internet
for mobile devices. It implements the HSS functionality
on a text file storing IMSI-key pairs.
1Note that this is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the open source
tools that have been tested within the scope of this project.
• srsLTE [10]: Partial implementation of the LTE stack that
provides full access to PHY layer features and metrics and
full access to decoded broadcast messages. The srsLTE
project recently introduced srsUE, an implementation of
the UE stack that allows to emulate a mobile device
against an eNodeB.
• gr-LTE [11]: Open source LTE implementation based on
gnuradio-companion, which makes it ideal for beginners
to start familiarizing with the LTE protocol and signal
processing steps. It mostly implements the PHY layer.
Most open source implementations can be run using stan-
dard off-the-shelf software radio, such as the USRP [12].
This tool allows both passive and active experimentation, as it
provides transmit and receive features. Passive traffic capture
and eNodeB broadcast information can also be performed with
much simpler platforms, such as RTL-SDR radios [13]. Note
that, to abide with regulations, active experimentation (i.e. UE
and eNodeB emulation) must be carried out in an RF shielded
environment.
The experimentation summarized in this manuscript has
been done with a Core i7 Ubuntu machine operating a USRP
B210 software radio platform. All the protocol exploits de-
scribed in this manuscript have been implemented by means of
a customized version of openLTE, adding certain new features
such as the collection of the IMSI of devices that attempt
to establish a connection. All active experimentation was
performed inside a Faraday cage using standard smartphones.
One of the versions of eNodeB scanner was implemented using
the same computing equipment and an RTL-SDR radio.
IV. LTE TRAFFIC CAPTURES
Most traffic captures displayed in this manuscript were
obtained with a Sanjole Wavejudge LTE sniffer and protocol
analyzer [14]. This tool provides the means to capture and
analyze traffic at the PHY layer as well as real-time capture
and decoding of MAC, RRC, NAS, etc traffic. The majority
of traffic capture analysis was performed with the Wavejudge
software provided by the same vendor.
The LTE passive traffic captures were obtained from pro-
duction networks in both the Honolulu and New York City
areas, providing a real snapshot of operational LTE mobile
networks in an urban environment. The traffic captures for
active experimentation, i.e. IMSI catcher and device blocking,
were obtained within a Faraday cage with a modified version
of openLTE acting as both the eNodeB and traffic sniffer, and
the author’s smartphone as commmunicating endpoint.
All user traffic, despite being fully encrypted and un-
decodable, was filtered out and only control plane traffic is
captured and analyzed. All traffic captures included in this
manuscript are edited to conceal the author’s smartphone
IMSI, cell IDs, mobile network operator identifiers and other
sensitive data.
V. LTE SECURITY AND PROTOCOL EXPLOITS
This section discusses the rationale behind LTE protocol
exploits based on the analysis of real LTE control plane
traffic captures. Based on this, a series of security aspects
and protocol exploits in the context of LTE are introduced,
from leveraging the information extracted from MIB and SIB
messages for rogue eNodeB configuration to denial of service
threats to temporarily block mobile devices and location leaks.
A. MIB and SIB message eavesdropping
The MIB and SIB messages are broadcasted and mapped
on the LTE frame over radio resources known a priori.
Moreover, these messages are transmitted with no encryption.
Therefore, any passive sniffer is able to decode them. This
simplifies the initial access procedure for the UEs but could
be potentially leveraged by an attacker to craft sophisticated
jamming attacks, optimize the configuration of a rogue base
station or tune other types of sophisticated attacks [15].
Fig. 4. Real capture of MIB and SIB1 LTE broadcast messages
Figure 4 provides an example of the contents of a MIB and
SIB1 message broadcasted by a commercial eNodeB in the
area of New York City. From the information extracted from
these messages, an adversary can learn the mobile operator
that operates that cell, the tracking area code, received power
threshold to trigger a handoff to an adjacent cell and a
series of configuration parameters that could be leveraged to
configure a rogue base station. One of the most useful pieces
of information, from a protocol exploit point of view, is the
list of high priority frequencies. These can be configured on a
rogue eNodeB to trigger most UEs to connect to it.
Moreover, an attacker can also extract the mapping of
important control channels on the PHY layer from the SIB
messages. This can be leveraged to configure a smart jammer
[6].
OpenLTE provides a traffic log feature that can be executed
to passively scan broadcast information from nearby eNodeBs.
A low-cost alternative can be implemented with an RTL-
SDR radio running the LTE Cell Scanner tool [13], [16]. The
analysis of MIB and SIB traffic in this project has been carried
out with a modified version of OpenLTE which automatically
detects new cells, decodes MIB and SIB messages and stores
the decoded information in a file. Figure 5 provides a snapshot
of the cell scanner while successfully detecting a cell in the
New York area and decoding the information on both MIB and
SIB1 messages. The author is in the process of developing
a portable LTE MIB/SIB message scanner leveraging the
latest small form-factor USRP B205-mini [12] being controlled
through the USB interface of an Android smartphone. Results
will be released and published once the author finds time to
finsh this project and carries the scanner around for a couple
of months.
Fig. 5. Customized LTE cell scanner based on openLTE decoding and storing
eNodeB MIB and SIB packets
B. LTE insecurity rationale
The strong encryption and mutual authentication algo-
rithms implemented in LTE networks often lead to the mis-
understanding that rogue base stations are not possible in
LTE. Similarly, threats such as IMSI catchers, also known
as Stingrays, rogue access points and the like are generally
assumed to exploit exclusively well understood vulnerabilities
in latency GSM networks. However, any LTE mobile device
will exchange a very large number of unencrypted and unpro-
tected messages with any LTE base station, malicious or not,
if it advertises itself with the right broadcast information. And
this broadcast information can be eavesdropped by means of
easily available tools, as discussed in Section V-A. In order to
optimize a malicious LTE access point, this can be configured
with one of the high priority frequencies, which can also be
extracted from unprotected broadcast messages.
Figure 6 plots the actual message exchange between a mo-
bile device and an eNodeB in order to establish a connection.
The traffic was captured in a controlled environment within a
Faraday cage with a single mobile device attaching to the cell.
As highlighted in the figure, despite the fact that encryption is
triggered upon mutual authentication, there is a large number
of messages exchanged prior to the authentication step, with
all this messages being sent in the clear and without integrity
protection. In other words, up to the Attach Request message
Fig. 6. Initial connection to an LTE network sniffed from a real production
network in the area of Honolulu, HI
that a UE sends to the eNodeB, a rogue base station can
impersonate a commercia eNodeB and the UE has no way
to verify its legitimacy.
Aside from all the messages up to the Attach Request, there
is a long list of other packets transmitted in the clear that can
be eavesdropped and spoofed.
• UE measurement reports: These reports often contain a
list of nearby towers and the received power from each
one of them, which can be potentially used to pinpoint the
UE’s location. In some rare cases, these contain explicitly
the GPS coordinates of the device itself [17].
• Handover trigger messages: As discussed later, these
messages can be leveraged to track a target device as it
hands from tower to tower.
• Paging messages: These messages, used by the network
to locate devices in order to deliver calls and incoming
connections, can be used to map a phone number to the
internal id used by the network for each user.
The remainder of this section discusses how to leverage
these unprotected messages to build a Stingray, temporarily
block devices and potentially track users.
C. LTE IMSI catcher
Although the IMSI should always be kept private and never
transmitted over the air, it is intuitive that it will be required
to communicate it at least once. The very first time a mobile
device is switched on and attempts to attach to the network,
it only has one possible unique identifier to be used in order
to authenticate with the network: the IMSI. Once the device
attaches to an LTE network, a TMSI is derived and can be
used thereafter to keep the IMSI secret [2].
As a result, regular operation of an LTE network requires
that a mobile device discloses in the clear its IMSI in specific
circumstances. For example, in the event that the network has
never derived a TMSI for that user before or in the rare event
that the TMSI has been lost. Note that the IMSI is transmitted
in a message before the authentication and encryption steps of
the NAS attach process. This is precisely what an IMSI catcher
exploits. Figure 7 presents a real capture of an AttachRequest
message in which a mobile device is disclosing its IMSI. This
was a controlled experiment with the author’s smartphone in
an isolated environment.
Fig. 7. IMSI of the author’s smartphone being transmitted in the clear
triggered by a software-radio IMSI catcher
An IMSI catcher [18], commonly known as Stingray, is
an active radio device that impersonates a, commonly, GSM
base station. In its most basic functionality, the IMSI catcher
receives connection/attach request messages from all mobile
devices in its vicinity. These attach messages are forced to
disclose the SIM’s IMSI, thus allowing the IMSI catcher to
retreive the IMSI for all devices in its vicinity. Stingrays, which
have been widely discussed in the generalist media recently,
are known for being often used by law enforcement to track
and locate suspects [19].
More advanced Stingrays actually complete the network
attach process, fully impersonating a real base station. At that
point, they can effectively act as a Man in the Middle (MitM)
for the device’s connection as long as it forwards the traffic
and calls into and from the real mobile network.
Although it is well understood that a MitM Stingray is
only possible in GSM, there is a general assumption that LTE
IMSI catchers are not possible or, at best, highly complex and
expensive [20]. However, a fully LTE-based IMSI catcher is
possible, very simple and very cheap to implement without re-
quiring to jam the LTE and 3G bands to downgrade the service
to GSM. In the context of this project, a fully operational IMSI
catcher was implemented on a USRP B210 running a modified
version of openLTE. A script was added to collect and store
the IMSI being disclosed by those devices within the radius
of coverage of the IMSI catcher. The total budget to build the
IMSI catcher was under $2000, including the radio, antennas,
GPS clock for the radio, etc. All experiments were carried out
in a Faraday cage and only three IMSIs were ever collected,
namely the author’s smartphone IMSI and the IMSI of two
LTE USB dongles. Figure 7 contains the capture of an Attach
Request message with the IMSI of the author’s phone, which
was captured by means of the software-radio IMSI catcher.
D. Temporary blocking mobile devices
The basic implementation of an LTE-based IMSI catcher
described in Section V-C replies with an Attach Reject message
to the Attach Request message, allowing the device to rapidly
re-connect with the legitimate network. As with other pre-
authentication messages, the Attach Reject message is sent in
Fig. 8. Mobile device temporary block by a rogue LTE base station
the clear, which can be exploited by an attacker to temporarily
block a mobile device.
3GPP defines a series of cause codes that the network
utilizes to indicate mobile devices the reason why, for example,
a connection is not allowed. These codes, are defined as EMM
causes in the LTE specifications [21].
Some of the EMM causes indicate the device that it
is not allowed to connect to the network (i.e. PLMN not
allowed EMM cause), which is a way a network provider
can block a customer who engages in, for example, mobile
fraud, spam, etc. Given that at the Attach Request stage in the
connection there is no authentication or encryption established
yet, any mobile device implicitly trusts the EMM cause codes
regardless of the legitimacy of the base station. In other words,
when the Attach Reject message is received, the base station is
not authenticated yet but the UE has to obey the Attach Reject
message.
If a rogue base station replies to an incoming connection
with an Attach Reject message, it can fool the mobile device to
believe that it is not allowed to connect to that given network.
As a result, the device will stop attempting to connect to any
base station of the provider that was being spoofed by the
rogue eNodeB. Figure 8 illustrates this exploit by which a
rogue base station effectively prevents any mobile device in its
radio communication range from connecting to the network,
resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
It is important to note that this is just a temporary DoS
threat. By simply rebooting the device or toggling airplane
mode, the device is capable again to connect to the network.
Given that toggling airplane mode is commonly the first thing
a user does when the cellular connection appears to be stalled,
the impact of this DoS threat on smartphones would be minor.
The impact could be more severe, though, in the case of an
embedded device servicing an application in the context of the
IoT. In the case of an embedded sensor deployed in the field
with mobile network connectivity, it might be expensive and
time-consuming to send a technician to reboot all the sensors
being affected.
LTE mobile devices implement a timer (T3245) which is
started when an Attach Reject message blocks the device from
further attempting to connect. Upon expiration of this timer, the
mobile device is allowed again to attempt to communicate and
attach with the blocked network. According to the standards,
this timer is configured to a value between 24 and 48 hours
[21]. Therefore, even in the context of an embedded sensor,
the DoS would only be sustained for 1 to 2 days. In some
applications, the impact of 24 hours of connectivity loss could
be very high, specially in critical and security applications.
This same attack can be also carried over by means of
replying with a reject message to the Traffic Area Update
(TAU) message. By means of configuring a rogue base station
with a different Tracking Area value than the surrounding
legitimate eNodeBs, one can trigger TAU messages from the
devices that attempt to connect with the rogue base station.
This LTE protocol exploit, which was first introduced by
the authors of [8] and later also discussed in [1], was imple-
mented by means of a modified version of openLTE running
on a USRP B210. All the experiments were carried in a
controlled environment resulting in the blocking of the author’s
smartphone and 2 LTE USB dongles. No experimentation
was carried over to determine the value of the timer T3245
because the author could not go about without phone for
24 hours. Excellent further analysis and results of this threat
were recently presented in [17] in an outstanding paper by the
authors.
E. Soft downgrade to GSM
Similarly to the DoS threat discussed in Section V-D, an
attacker can trigger a soft downgrade of the connection to
GSM, known for being highly insecure [5]. Exploiting the
same TAU Reject and Attach Reject messages, a rogue base
station can indicate a victim mobile device that it is not allowed
to access 3G and LTE services on that given operator (EPS
services not allowed EMM cause code). The target mobile
device will then only attempt to connect to GSM base stations,
as described in Figure 9.
An attacker could combine this with a rogue GSM base
station, which would open the doors to a full MitM threat, fully
eavesdropping all mobile network traffic. This would allow
the attacker to listen to phone calls, read text messages and
a long list of other known GSM threats [22]. Moreover, by
configuring the rogue base station to target a specific user,
one could leverage this technology for a spearphishing threat
aiming to a specific device. As the device would not loose
connectivity, the user might not realize it is connected through
GSM unless.
Fig. 9. Mobile device soft downgrading to GSM by rogue LTE base station
F. LTE device tracking with C-RNTI
This sub-section introduces a previously unknown LTE
exploit that could potentially allow a passive adversary (i.e.
only sniffing capabilities) to locate and track devices and users
as they move. This location leak threat was first disclosed by
the author in [1] and has already been discussed and analyzed
with both GSMA and 3GPP.
The Cell Random Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI,
RNTI for short from here on) is a PHY layer identifier unique
per device within a given cell. In other words, there are no two
devices within a cell with the same RNTI. But there could be
two devices in adjacent cells with the same RNTI.
This 16-bit identifier is assigned to each mobile device
during the Random Access Procedure [2]. The eNodeB re-
sponds to the device’s preamble with a MAC Random Access
Response (MAC RAR) message that indicates, in the clear, the
RNTI to be used by the device in that cell, as shown in Figure
10.
Passive analysis of real LTE traffic indicates that the
RNTI is included in the header (unencrypted PHY layer
encapsulation) of every single packet, regardless of whether
it is signaling or user traffic. This allows, as shown in Figure
11, a passive observer to easily map traffic, regardless of its
encryption, to an individual device or user.
Mapping of a TMSI or MSISDN to the RNTI is trivial.
By means of silent text messages or other mobile terminated
traffic, an attacker can identify the current RNTI of a given
device. Once this PHY layer id is known, a passive eavesdrop-
per can know, for example, how long a given user stays at a
given location. Assuming that an average smartphone will keep
connecting to the network to receive email, SMSs, Whatsap
messages, check for pull notifications and the like, there is
going to be frequent and periodic data traffic originated or
terminated at the device, allowing an eavesdropper to know the
user is still there, while perhaps a partner of the eavesdropper
is robbing the user’s apartment. Moreover, assuming that
the control plane traffic load for a mobile device is much
lower than the actual user data load, the RNTI could also be
leveraged to estimate the UL and DL data traffic load of a given
device. This could potentially allow and adversary to identify
the connectivity hotspot of an ad-hoc LTE-based network, such
as the ones being considered for both first responders [23] and
tactical scenarios [24].
Examination of the 3GPP standards [25] indicate that the
RNTI is defined as a unique id for identifying the RRC
connection and scheduling dedicated to a particular UE. Al-
though initially assigned as a temporary id, it is promoted to a
static value after connection establishment or re-establishment.
There is no explicit indications in the standards regarding
the requirements for the RNTI being refreshed periodically.
Observations of real LTE traffic from the major operators in the
United States indicate that often the RNTI remains static for
long period of times. The author’s smartphone was observed
to maintain the same RNTI for over 4 hours.
Fig. 10. RNTI assignment in the RACH LTE procedure
Further analysis of LTE traffic uncovered a potential way
a passive eavesdropper could track devices during mobility
handover events. In LTE, handovers are network-triggered.
Based on periodic measurement reports from the UEs, the
eNodeBs decide whether it is necessary to hand the connection
to an adjacent cell. As such, the handover is triggered by the
source eNodeB through the RRC Connection Reconfiguration
message. In this packet, the source eNodeB indicates the UE
what is the destination eNodeB and provides some parameters
necessary for the UE to connect to the new tower. Upon
reception of this message, the UE performs a random access
procedure with the destination eNodeB, which assigns it a new
RNTI. At this point, the handover is complete and the UE
completes the RRC connection with the destination eNodeB.
During the investigation of LTE security and protocol
exploits, it was discovered that, in some cases, the RNTI that
was initially assigned to the UE by the destination eNodeB was
always quickly updated shortly after via an RRC Connection
Reconfiguration message from the source eNodeB. Further
inspection of the captures highlighted that, in the original RRC
Connection Reconfiguration message sent from the source
eNodeB to initiate the handover process, a new RNTI is
explicitly provided by the eNodeB in a Mobility Control Info
container [25]. This RNTI being explicitly provided matches
the RNTI that is assigned to the UE at the destination cell via
the RRC Connection Reconfiguration message.
Based on observations of real LTE traffic, the message that
triggers the handover process appears to be sent in the clear.
As a result, a passive eavesdropper can potentially track a
given device in a cell and, upon a handover event, follow the
connection to the destination cell (indicated in the message
that triggers the handover) and intercept the RNTI that is
assigned to the device in this new cell. This location and
handover information leak was observed to not occur always.
Discussions with the GSMA security team indicated that the
RRC Connection Reconfiguration message that triggers the
handover should not be transmitted in the clear.
Fig. 11. Identifying the traffic of a given device with the RNTI
Figure 12 presents an example of such device tracking
during a handover process. In the figure, a UE with RNTI
99 is connected to cell id 60. At some point it receives
an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message triggering the
connection to be handed over to cell id 50 and explicitly
indicates the UE that its new RNTI at the destination cell
will be 10848 (0x2A60). The UE performs a random access
procedure and is assigned an RNTI 112 via the MAC RAR
message. However, shortly after the handover, the destination
eNB (cell id 50) sends an RRC Connection Reconfiguration
message that assigns the final RNTI at the destination cell,
10848. Note that, as part of the handover process, the UE still
receives a couple of RRC messages from the source eNB (cell
id 60) when it has already connected to the destination eNB
and these are addressed to the old RNTI 99.
Although the standards do not explicitly indicate a need
to refresh the RNTI periodically, this would be a strong
mitigation against the threat of RNTI-based location tracking.
For example, a new RNTI could be assigned each time a device
transitions from idle to connected state. Also, it should be
enforced that the handover trigger message is always encrypted
as this message occurs after authentication and encryption set
up. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these solutions
might not be sufficient. An LTE analysis tool introduced in [26]
leverages the RNTI in order to map PHY layer measurements
to a given device. In the event of an RNTI change, the
authors devised an algorithm that was able to automatically
map each device to its new RNTI. Keeping a fingerprint of
Fig. 12. RNTI device tracking during a handover process
signal measurements for each RNTI, the authors were able to
track users as their RNTI changed with a precision of 98.4%.
VI. RELATED WORK
The wide availability of open source tools for GSM exper-
imentation has fueled a large array of very interesting security
research on legacy networks. From the first demonstrations of
GSM traffic interception and eavesdropping [5] to DoS threats
against the GSM air interface [27], a number of GSM exploits
have been reported in the literature and security conferences.
Privacy and location leaks have also been deeply investigated
in the context of legacy GSM networks [28].
LTE security research has been increasingly predominant
over the last couple of years, mainly in network availability
related projects. For example, there has been interesting studies
aiming to quantify and investigate the impact of large spikes
of traffic load originated from M2M systems against the LTE
infrastructure [29]. Also in the context of M2M, several studies
have focused on the control plane signaling impact of the IoT
against the LTE mobile core [30], [31].
Applied LTE security research and protocol exploit exper-
imentation have been close to non-existent over the last few
years. However, the recent availability of open source tools
for LTE experimentation have provided the means for very
interesting security research work. For example, some recent
studies aimed at analyzing and evaluating sophisticated jam-
ming threats against LTE networks [32], [33]. Also leveraging
LTE open source tools, the authors of [17] were the first to
publicly disclose the implementation and analysis of the device
blocking and soft downgrade to GSM exploits, which were
also implemented in this manuscript. The same authors are
responsible for some other excellent mobile protocol exploit
experimentation, such as a study on intercepting phone calls
and text messages in GSM networks [34] and mobile phone
baseband fuzzing [35].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This manuscript summarizes the experimentation and re-
sults of analyzing the security of next generation LTE networks
with low-cost software-radio tools. Based on tools built upon
the openLTE implementation of the LTE stack, the rationale
behind a number of LTE protocol exploits is defined. Despite
mutual authentication and strong encryption, there is still a
large number of packets being exchanged, in the clear, between
a UE and an eNodeB prior to these security functions being
executed. A mobile device implicitly trusts these messages as
long as they originate from an eNodeB broadcasting the right
information, which opens the doors to a series of LTE rogue
base station threats.
Basic software-radio tools can be used to scan the LTE
broadcast channels so that a rogue access point can be correctly
configured. Once mobile devices attempt to attach to this
malicious eNodeB, different exploits are possible by leveraging
the unencrypted pre-authentication messages. This manuscript
provides details on the implementation of an LTE-based IMSI
catcher using off the shelf hardware with a budget under
$2000.
Moreover, we investigate and implement DoS threats that
block mobile devices and silently downgrade them to an inse-
cure GSM connection. Such results are achivable by leveraging
the EMM cause codes within the Attach Reject messages
the rogue eNodeB transmits. Finally, a previously unknown
LTE location leak is introduced and analyzed. By means of
monitoring the RNTI PHY layer id, one could potentially track
and follow a mobile user as it hands from tower to tower.
The growing number of LTE open source implementations
is lowering the bar for software-radio experimentation and
analysis of mobile protocols. Thanks to the efforts of the
open source community, such tools are fueling sophisticated
research studies aimed at improving the security of mobile
networks.
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